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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether the 
City of Wilmington's method of testing firefighters for drug 
use violates their rights under the Fourth Amendment. We 
will affirm the district court's conclusion that it does not. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Honorable Stephen M. Orlofsky, United States District Court Judge for 
the District of New Jersey, sitting by designation. 
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Nevertheless, we will remand the case for reconsideration of 
the state law invasion of privacy claim. 
 
Beverly Wilcher, Sharon Smith, Michael Danylo and 
Cornelius Skinner are Wilmington firefighters. Along with 
the Wilmington Fire Fighters Association (WFFA), they 
brought this class action on behalf of all firefighters in the 
city. The defendants are the City of Wilmington, Mayor Sills 
(in his official capacity), James T. Wilmore (individually and 
in his capacity as Fire Chief), Clifton Armstead (individually 
and in his official capacity as Deputy Fire Chief), Wayne 
Crosse (in his official capacity as Director of Personnel for 
Wilmington), and William Yanonis (individually and in his 
official capacity as Deputy Director of Personnel). In 
addition, the firefighters sued SODAT-Delaware, Inc., the 
drug testing company that performs the tests for the City of 
Wilmington. The firefighters sought injunctive relief and 
damages under 42 U.S.C. S 1983 and damages for"invasion 
of privacy" under the state's tort law. 
 
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of 
the individual defendants on the ground that they were 
entitled to qualified immunity and in favor of the SODAT 
defendants on the ground that SODAT was not a state 
actor. The district court then held a three-day trial. Two 
days into the trial, the plaintiffs apprised the district court 
of this Court's statement in Bolden v. SEPTA, 953 F.2d 807, 
822-23 n.23 (3d Cir. 1991), that reasonableness under the 
Fourth Amendment was an issue of law. Concluding that 
there were no remaining factual issues for the jury to 
decide, the district court, with the plaintiffs' acquiescence, 
dismissed the jury. The court then decided against the 
plaintiffs on the merits of their Fourth Amendment claim. 
See Wilcher v. City of Wilmington, No. 94-137, slip. op. 
(D.Del. June 30, 1995). The district court also concluded 
that plaintiffs could not prevail on their state law invasion 
of privacy claim. The district court eventually elaborated on 
its findings in a memorandum opinion rejecting the 
plaintiffs' motion for reargument and for a new trial. See 
Wilcher v. City of Wilmington, 924 F.Supp. 613 (D.Del. 
1996). 
 
The firefighters have appealed on several grounds. First, 
they cite as error the district court's failure to enter an 
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injunction permanently prohibiting the City from using the 
direct observation method in its urine collecting, despite the 
fact that during a pre-trial teleconference the City had 
tentatively agreed to such an arrangement. Second, they 
dispute the district court's conclusion that direct 
observation of urine collection is reasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment. Third, they appeal the district court's 
determinations regarding qualified immunity and state 
action. Fourth, they urge that, in denying the plaintiffs a 
jury trial, the district court misapplied our decision in 
Bolden. Finally, the plaintiffs contend that the district court 
committed error when it presumed that the reasonableness 
standard under the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution 
was equivalent to the reasonable person standard under 
Delaware tort law.2 
 
We will reject all the plaintiffs' grounds for appeal except 
for the fifth one. The district court did not abuse its 
discretion when it denied plaintiffs' motion for injunctive 
relief, following the City's rejection of the tentative 
agreement. In addition, we agree with the district court that 
a drug testing monitor's presence in the same room with 
the firefighter during the collection of thatfirefighter's urine 
does not, by itself, constitute an unreasonable search 
under the Fourth Amendment. As for the plaintiffs' jury 
trial right, we agree that the district court misread our 
decision in Bolden when it concluded that no factual 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The plaintiffs also contend that the district court should not have 
determined that SODAT's drug testing method was not in violation of the 
firefighters' Collective Bargaining Agreement with the City. See Wilcher, 
at 17-19 (June 30, 1996 Memorandum). According to the plaintiffs, this 
issue was moot by the close of the trial because the City had agreed at 
least temporarily to discontinue using the method. Because the City has 
explicitly reserved its right to use this procedure in the future, we do 
not 
agree that this issue is "moot." Moreover, the City has never conceded 
the impermissibility of SODAT's drug testing procedure under the 
Collective Bargaining Agreement with the firefighters. Nevertheless, we 
agree that this issue should not have been decided by the district court. 
The plaintiffs never raised the Collective Bargaining Agreement in the 
pleadings. Moreover, when the case was tried, plaintiffs had not yet 
exhausted their administrative remedies, such as arbitration. Therefore, 
the issue was not properly before the district court, and we will vacate 
the district court's ruling on it. 
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determinations remained for the jury. Nevertheless, we will 
not reverse the district court's dismissal of the jury because 
the plaintiffs clearly acquiesced in this action and thereby 
waived their jury right under Rule 39(a) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
 
However, despite our affirmance of the district court's 
constitutional analysis, we will remand this case for further 
proceedings because we believe the court erred in 
presuming the equivalence of the "reasonableness" inquiry 
under the Fourth Amendment and the "reasonable person" 
standard under the common law in an invasion of privacy 
claim. 
 
I. FACTS 
 
In July 1990, the City and the Wilmington Fire Fighters 
Association (the firefighters' union) agreed in a Collective 
Bargaining Agreement that firefighters would be subject to 
random drug testing through urinalysis in order to ensure 
that members of the Fire Department were drug free. Prior 
to January 1994, the City had employed a procedure 
whereby a randomly selected firefighter was notified he 
would be tested when he arrived at the station to begin his 
shift. A battalion chief would then stay with the firefighter 
and take him to Occupational Health Services at the 
Medical Center of Delaware ("Occupational Health") where 
the test was performed. There, the battalion leader would 
conduct the firefighter to a "dry room" to produce the urine 
specimen. The sink in the dry room did not contain water 
and the toilet bowl contained blue dye to prevent cheating 
by dilution. The firefighters provided their urine specimens 
in private; no observer was present in the dry room. 
Occupational Health's method of collecting urine in this 
manner followed the guidelines of the National Institute of 
Drug Abuse. 
 
In November 1993, in an attempt to reduce the cost of 
random drug testing, the City solicited bids from drug 
testing facilities. The City did not specifically request a 
procedure which included visual observation of urine 
collection. SODAT, a private drug-testing company in 
Delaware with a primary focus on outpatient drug- 
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counseling, submitted a proposal under which fire-fighters 
would produce the urine sample "under the direct 
supervision of counselor/authorized personnel." The City 
accepted SODAT's bid. 
 
In January 1994, SODAT began drug testing the City's 
firefighters. The parties have given substantially different 
descriptions of how the SODAT employees carried out this 
procedure. The male firefighters, for example, claim that the 
SODAT monitor looked over the firefighter's shoulder at his 
genitals while he urinated. SODAT, on the other hand, 
claims that the monitors stood to the back or the right of 
the firefighters but did not directly observe their genitalia. 
 
Although SODAT employees are directed to observe the 
urine collection process by looking in the firefighter's 
general direction as he or she commences urination, the 
monitors are neither directed nor expected to focus on the 
firefighter's genitals. At trial, the SODAT monitors 
maintained that they had acted within the company's 
guidelines. 
 
After hearing this testimony, the district court accepted 
SODAT's portrayal of the monitoring process as accurate. 
"An examination of the SODAT testing program, both in 
terms of its design and intent, and more specifically in its 
execution, demonstrates that no element of the program 
was intended to invade the privacy of a firefighter in an 
overly intrusive manner." Wilcher, 924 F.Supp. at 617. The 
district court further stated, "Although [the collection 
process] may have involved some observation of the 
genitalia area generally, this observation was only a by- 
product of the general observation of the donor." Id. at 618. 
In its earlier memorandum, the district court had also 
stated: 
 
       On the evidence submitted by the parties, the Court 
       finds that the direct supervision procedure employed 
       by SODAT did not in principal or in fact involve the 
       direct observation of the genital area of the person 
       providing the urine sample. . . . [SODAT's procedure] 
       does not direct that the SODAT employee undertake to 
       observe the genital area of the individual providing the 
       sample. It only requires supervision during the 
       collection process. 
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Wilcher, slip. op. at 11. The district court further concluded, 
"The Court is convinced that the testimony concerning the 
position of the SODAT employee during the specimen 
collection is corroborated and demonstrates that genital 
observation was not the purpose nor the practice of the 
SODAT policy." Id. 
 
Soon after SODAT began testing firefighters, the Deputy 
Fire Chief was informed of the firefighters' complaints about 
SODAT's testing method. The City did not, however, request 
that SODAT stop using the direct observation procedure. 
The firefighters' union, the Wilmington Fire Fighters 
Association, filed a first step grievance with the City of 
Wilmington protesting the direct observation procedure. 
The Deputy Chief denied this grievance. The WFFA filed a 
second step grievance, which was denied on February 17, 
1994. The WFFA then filed a Notice of Arbitration. The 
plaintiffs filed suit on March 18, 1994, against the City and 
the individual defendants. The City impleaded SODAT, and 
the plaintiffs amended their complaint to include SODAT as 
a defendant. In an Order and Stipulation filed on April 15, 
1994, the parties agreed that the City should direct SODAT 
to refrain from using direct observation of urination while 
this case was pending. 
 
The district court had jurisdiction over this case 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. SS 1331 and 1343. We now have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1291. 
 
II. THE "TENTATIVE AGREEMENT" 
 
Before we proceed with our analysis of the constitutional 
issue, we will address the plaintiffs' contention that the 
district court erred in not permanently enjoining the City 
from using SODAT's direct observation method of drug 
testing. We find no such error. 
 
On April 15, 1994, the parties filed a Stipulation and 
Order temporarily enjoining the City from further use of the 
direct observation method during the pendency of this case. 
On June 16, the parties participated with the district court 
in a teleconference, during which the City expressed its 
willingness to refrain permanently from using the direct 
observation method. At the end of the teleconference, 
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SODAT's counsel stated that she would draft a stipulation 
and order to that effect and send it around to the other 
parties for their signature. 
 
Despite this tentative agreement, the plaintiffs and the 
City of Wilmington were unable to arrive at an accord on 
the terms of the stipulation. The City therefore refused to 
sign it. The plaintiffs then filed a motion with the district 
court for an order permanently enjoining the City and 
SODAT from further use of the direct observation method of 
urine collection. The district court denied this motion 
without opinion on March 31, 1995. The plaintiffs argue 
that this denial was error, as the City defendants had 
reneged on their agreement in bad faith. The defendants 
reply that the oral agreement was only tentative. 
 
As a general rule, we encourage attempts to settle 
disagreements outside the litigative context. A settlement 
agreement is a contract and is interpreted according to 
local law. See Pennwalt Corp. v. Plough, Inc., 676 F.2d 77, 
79 (3d Cir. 1982). A district court may enter injunctive 
relief on a party's behalf to enforce a settlement agreement 
when it determines that one of the parties has failed to 
perform its obligations. See Read v. Baker, 438 F.Supp. 
732, 735 (D. Del. 1977), citing Petty v. General Accident Fire 
& Life Assurance Co., 365 F.2d 419, 421 (3d Cir. 1966). 
The power to grant or deny an injunction, however, is firmly 
within the discretion of the district court. See Castrol, Inc. 
v. Pennzoil Co., 987 F.2d 939, 943 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 
According to the City, the district court did not abuse its 
discretion by denying the injunction because the parties 
had produced no more than a tentative agreement, 
unenforceable by law. We agree. Under Delaware law, the 
criteria for deciding whether a contract exists is the 
intention of the parties, evidenced by their objective 
conduct and manifestations. See Industrial America, Inc. v. 
Fulton Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 412, 415 (Del. 1971). The 
parties' subjective intent is irrelevant. Id. Rather, the 
court's inquiry is "whether a reasonable man would, based 
upon the `objective manifestation of assent' and all of the 
surrounding circumstances, conclude that the parties 
intended to be bound by contract." Leeds v. First Allied 
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Connecticut Corp., 521 A.2d 1095, 1101 (Del.Ch. 1986). As 
Chancellor Allen has noted, 
 
       This is not a simple or mechanical test to apply. 
       Negotiations typically proceed over time with 
       agreements on some points being reached along the 
       way towards a completed negotiation. It is when all of 
       the terms that the parties themselves regard as 
       important have been negotiated that a contract is 
       formed. 
 
Leeds, 521 A.2d at 1101 (emphasis added). The Chancellor 
further stated, "Until it is reasonable to conclude . . . that 
all of the points that the parties themselves regard as 
essential have been expressly or . . . implicitly resolved, the 
parties have not finished their negotiations and have not 
formed a contract." Id., at 1102. 
 
These basic principles of contract law lead us to conclude 
that the district court committed no abuse of discretion in 
denying injunctive relief. Although the parties agreed in 
principle at the pre-trial teleconference to a stipulation 
permanently halting the direct observation procedure, they 
did not discuss the details of the agreement. Thus, we 
cannot say that all the essential terms were resolved before 
or during the teleconference. The teleconference 
represented but one step of a complex negotiation between 
three parties (the firefighters, the City, and SODAT). The 
record indicates that the City made a good faith effort to 
work with the plaintiffs to draft a stipulation acceptable to 
everyone. Unfortunately, the parties never reached that 
stage. This failure, however, does not represent a breach of 
contract. Accordingly, we will affirm the district court's 
denial of the permanent injunction. 
 
III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF 
DIRECT OBSERVATION 
 
The gravamen of the plaintiffs' complaint is that the 
direct observation method of urine collection violates the 
firefighters' right under the Fourth Amendment, as 
incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment, to be free from 
unreasonable searches and seizures. The district court held 
that the direct observation method, as executed by SODAT, 
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did not constitute an "unreasonable" search. Because the 
reasonableness of a search under the Fourth Amendment is 
an issue of law, we exercise plenary review. See Bolden, 953 
F.2d at 822-23 n.23; Dykes v. SEPTA, 68 F.3d 1564, 1568 
(3d Cir. 1995). 
 
The Fourth Amendment guarantees the "right of the 
people to be secure in their persons . . . against 
unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. Amend. 
IV. It is well established that the government's collection 
and testing of an employee's urine constitutes a "search" 
under the Fourth Amendment. Skinner v. Railway Labor 
Executives' Assn., 489 U.S. 602, 617; Treasury Employees 
v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665 (1989). Ordinarily, the 
Constitution requires the government to obtain a warrant 
supported by probable cause to search a person or his 
property. There are, however, several well-established 
exceptions to the warrant and probable cause 
requirements. The Supreme Court has explained: 
 
       [O]ur cases establish that where a Fourth Amendment 
       intrusion serves special government needs, beyond the 
       normal need for law enforcement, it is necessary to 
       balance the individual's privacy expectations against 
       the Government's interests to determine whether it is 
       impractical to require a warrant or some level of 
       individualized suspicion in the particular context. 
 
Von Rabb, 489 U.S. at 665-66. See also Griffin v. Wisconsin, 
483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 
325, 340 (1985). Under the "special needs" analysis, the 
government need not show probable cause or even 
individualized suspicion for its search. Instead, it must 
prove that its search meets a general test of 
"reasonableness." Under this standard, the constitutionality 
of a particular search " `is judged by balancing its intrusion 
on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its 
promotion of legitimate governmental interests.' " Skinner, 
489 U.S. at 619 (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 
654 (1979)). In particular, the Supreme Court's 
jurisprudence directs us to consider three factors when 
judging the constitutionality of employee drug tests: (1) the 
nature of the privacy interest upon which the search 
intrudes; (2) the extent to which the search intrudes on the 
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employee's privacy; and (3) the nature and immediacy of 
the governmental concern at issue, and the efficacy of the 
means employed by the government for meeting that 
concern. Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S.Ct. 2386 
(1995). 
 
The firefighters do not dispute the reasonableness of 
compulsory drug testing per se. To the contrary, the 
firefighters have agreed to drug testing in their Collective 
Bargaining Agreement with the City. Rather, the plaintiffs 
challenge the City's method of testing, which entails visual 
observation of the firefighters as they provide their urine 
samples. This issue has been described as "distinct and 
clearly severable from those that govern reasonable 
suspicion testing generally". National Treasury Employees 
Union v. Yeutter, 918 F.2d 968, 975 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
For this reason, we apply the Fourth Amendment's 
reasonableness test solely to the direct observation method 
utilized by SODAT and not to the broader issue of 
compulsory drug testing. See id.3  
 
A. The Nature of the Firefighters' Privacy Interest 
 
"Reasonableness" entails a three pronged inquiry. First, a 
court examines the individual's privacy interest upon which 
the search at issue allegedly intrudes. See Vernonia, 115 
S.Ct. at 2391 (1995). This expectation of privacy must be 
legitimate as measured by objective standards. "The Fourth 
Amendment does not protect all subjective expectations of 
privacy, but only those that society recognizes as 
`legitimate.' " Id. 
 
The district court properly concluded that firefighters 
enjoy only a diminished expectation of privacy. "Because 
they are in a highly regulated industry, and because they 
had consented to random testing in their collective 
bargaining agreement, the firefighters had a reduced 
privacy interest." Wilcher, 924 F.Supp. at 618. Plaintiffs 
now argue on appeal that the firefighting industry is not 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Because it is the method of testing, rather than the fact of testing, 
which is at issue, we do not find that appellants' post-argument citation 
to Chandler v. Miller, 117 S.Ct. 1295 (1997), is helpful to our 
considerations here. 
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"highly regulated" and that the firefighters therefore did not 
have a diminished expectation of privacy. 
 
Plaintiffs' argument lacks merit. Even though extensive 
regulation of an industry may diminish an employee's 
expectation of privacy, see Policemen's Benevolent Ass'n, 
Local 318 v. Township of Washington, 850 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 
1988) (police department described as "highly regulated"); 
Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir. 1986) 
(upholding law requiring jockeys to submit to breathalyser 
and random urinalysis testing), we have never held that 
regulation alone is the sole factor that determines the scope 
of an employee's expectation of privacy. It is also the safety 
concerns associated with a particular type of employment 
-- especially those concerns that are well-known to 
prospective employees -- which diminish an employee's 
expectation of privacy. Supreme Court precedent 
demonstrates this principle. In National Treasury 
Employees v. Von Raab, the Court held that a government 
employee's expectation of privacy depended in part on the 
nature of his employment and whether it posed an 
attendant threat to public safety. See 489 U.S. at 672. 
Upholding the drug testing of customs officials, the Court 
explained: 
 
       We think Customs employees who are directly involved 
       in the interdiction of illegal drugs or who are required 
       to carry firearms in the line of duty likewise have a 
       diminished expectation of privacy in respect to the 
       intrusions occasioned by a urine test. Unlike most 
       private citizens or government employees in general, 
       employees involved in drug interdiction reasonably 
       should expect effective inquiry into their fitness and 
       probity . . . . Because successful performance of their 
       duties depends uniquely on their judgment and 
       dexterity, these employees cannot reasonably expect to 
       keep . . . personal information that bears directly on 
       their fitness. 
 
Id. (emphasis added). Customs officials enjoyed a reduced 
expectation of privacy because of the sensitive nature of 
their duties and of the information they received. We have 
held that railway employees also enjoy a diminished 
expectation of privacy because of the safety concerns 
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associated with those who operate trains. See e.g. Transport 
Workers' Union, Local 234 v. SEPTA, 884 F.2d 709, 712 (3d 
Cir. 1988) (random testing of rail operators upheld because 
of "great human loss" they can cause prior to detection of 
drug problem). 
 
Certainly, a firefighter with a drug problem poses as great 
a threat to public safety as does a customs official or a rail 
operator. A firefighter whose drug use is undetected is a 
source of danger both to his colleagues and to the 
community at large. In addition, the firefighter puts himself 
at great risk of harm. Since the perils associated with 
firefighting are well known, we have no trouble concluding 
that firefighters enjoy a diminished expectation of privacy. 
Our inquiry, however, does not end here, as we must 
balance the firefighters' diminished interest with the 
character of the search at issue and with the concerns that 
have propelled that search. 
 
B. The Character of the Search 
 
The second factor we must consider is the character of 
the government's search and the extent to which it intrudes 
on the employee's privacy. The Supreme Court has held 
that the degree of intrusion "depends upon the manner in 
which production of the urine sample is monitored." 
Vernonia, 115 S.Ct. at 2393. Before we judge the 
intrusiveness of SODAT's drug testing method, however, we 
must first determine what that method actually entails. 
 
At trial and on appeal, both the plaintiffs and the SODAT 
employees have presented highly divergent pictures of the 
urine collection process. The firefighters claim that 
monitors looked at their genitalia as they urinated. SODAT 
and its employees, on the other hand, steadfastly maintain 
that they did not focus on the firefighters' genitalia during 
the urine collection process. Instead, they claim that they 
looked in the firefighters' general direction to ensure that 
no tampering was taking place during the production of the 
urine specimen. 
 
Based on the evidence before it, the trial court concluded 
that SODAT's drug testing procedure involved only the 
monitors' direct observation of the urine collection process 
in general and not the intentional observation of the 
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firefighters' genitalia. Wilcher, 924 F. Supp. at 617-18. We 
accept as accurate the district court's finding of fact 
concerning the nature of the urine collection process 
employed by SODAT. Although the reasonableness of a 
search is a legal question, the particular character of that 
search is a factual matter. Cf. O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 
709, 726-729 (factual dispute regarding character of search 
precluded lower court's grant of summary judgment on 
Fourth Amendment issue). As such, the trial judge's factual 
finding regarding the character of SODAT's drug testing 
procedure is reversible only if it is clearly erroneous. See 
Marco v. Accent Pub. Co., Inc., 969 F.2d 1547, 1548 (3d Cir. 
1992). In light of the nature of the testimony from the 
SODAT employees, which the trial judge chose to credit, we 
cannot say that the district court's finding was clearly 
erroneous.4 Consequently, we will adopt the district court's 
description of the SODAT procedure as one which entails 
only incidental observation of a firefighters' genitals. 
 
Having adopted the district court's description of the 
SODAT drug-testing procedure, we must concede that the 
direct observation method represents a significant intrusion 
on the privacy of any government employee. Urination has 
been regarded traditionally by our society as a matter 
"shielded by great privacy." Skinner, 489 U.S. at 626; 109 
S.Ct. at 1418. Few cases have dealt with the issue of the 
specific method used by the government to test its 
employees for drugs. In Vernonia School District 47J v. 
Acton, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a 
mandatory random drug testing program that a school 
district employed to reduce drug use among its student 
athletes. The Court described the Vernonia drug testing 
procedure in the following manner: 
 
       The student to be tested completes a specimen control 
       form which bears an assigned number. . . . The 
       student then enters an empty locker room 
       accompanied by an adult monitor of the same sex. 
       Each boy selected produces a sample at a urinal, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. In addition, we note the concession of plaintiffs' attorney at oral 
argument that she was not seeking reversal of the trial court's factual 
findings. 
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       remaining fully clothed with his back to the monitor, 
       who stands approximately 12 to 15 feet behind the 
       student. Monitors may (though do not always) watch 
       the student while he produces the sample, and they 
       listen for normal sounds of urination. Girls produce 
       samples in an enclosed bathroom stall, so that they 
       can be heard but not observed. 
 
Vernonia, 115 S.Ct. at 2389. The Supreme Court concluded 
that this method of testing was not unreasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment. "Under such conditions, the privacy 
interests compromised by the process of obtaining the urine 
sample are in our view negligible." Vernonia, 115 S.Ct. at 
2393. 
 
Relying on Vernonia, the district court stated, "The Court 
finds the SODAT collection method no more intrusive on 
the firefighters' privacy than was the high school's drug 
testing program found to be constitutional in [Vernonia]" 
Wilcher, 924 F. Supp. at 618. The district court further 
concluded, "The presence of monitors in the bathrooms 
with firefighters is similar to the presence of the monitors 
in Vernonia, and even though the monitors may have stood 
closer than those in Vernonia, this close proximity was a 
result of the collection facilities, in this case a bathroom as 
opposed to a locker room, and not a more intrusive 
method." Wilcher, 984 F.Supp. at 619. 
 
We agree with the district court insofar as its analogy to 
Vernonia applies to male firefighters. In a world where men 
frequently urinate at exposed urinals in public restrooms, 
it is difficult to characterize SODAT's procedure as a 
significant intrusion on the male firefighters' privacy.5 
Plaintiffs fail to demonstrate how the presence of a monitor 
in a boys locker room while a student athlete urinates 
differs significantly from the presence of a monitor in a 
bathroom while an adult firefighter urinates. Both monitors 
stand behind the individual providing the urine specimen. 
Similarly, as the district court found, both monitors observe 
only the collection process generally and not the particular 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. See also Dimeo v. Griffin, 943 F.2d 679, 682 (7th Cir. 1991) (noting 
that "[u]rination is generally a private activity in our culture, though, 
for 
most men, not highly private.") 
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individual's genitalia. The only difference is the distance 
between the monitor and the person producing the 
specimen. We cannot conclude that this difference by itself 
justifies a determination that SODAT procedure is  
unreasonable.6 
 
We must admit that we are more cautious about the 
reasonableness of the direct observation method as it 
applies to female firefighters. We simply cannot characterize 
the presence of a monitor in a bathroom while a female 
urinates as an ordinary aspect of daily life. Indeed, 
Vernonia noted with approval the fact that female student 
athletes provided urine behind a stall as monitors stood 
outside listening. Vernonia, 115 S.Ct. at 2393. 
Nevertheless, nothing in Vernonia suggests that the 
presence of a female monitor in a bathroom when an adult 
female firefighter provides a urine specimen is per se 
unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment. Moreover, 
the facts of this case suggest that SODAT took substantial 
measures to minimize the intrusion of privacy to female 
firefighters caused by the direct observation procedure. The 
district court found that the female monitors stood to the 
side of the female firefighters and that the monitors did not 
look at the firefighters' genitalia as they urinated, but 
rather in their general direction. Wilcher, 924 F.Supp. at 
617-18. Finally, SODAT provided a nurse-practitioner as a 
monitor for plaintiff Wilcher when she expressed discomfort 
with her first female monitor. Thus, although wefind 
SODAT's intrusion of the female firefighters' privacy to be 
significant, we nevertheless agree with the defendants that 
SODAT has carried out its testing procedure in an 
appropriate and professional manner. 
 
C. The Governmental Concern 
 
The third and final component of the "reasonableness" 
test under the Fourth Amendment is the government's 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. We note that our conclusion might differ had the district court 
accepted the firefighters' testimony that SODAT's monitors looked over 
firefighters' shoulders as they provided their urine specimens. Similarly, 
we would be much more concerned with a procedure's intrusion on 
privacy if it required the monitor to stand in front of the firefighter, 
or if 
it demanded the direct observation of the firefighter's genitalia. 
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interest, which must be compelling. With regard to this 
prong, the Supreme Court has observed: 
 
       It is a mistake . . . to think that the phrase `compelling 
       state interest,' in the Fourth Amendment context, 
       describes a fixed, minimum quantum of governmental 
       concern, so that one can dispose of a case by 
       answering in isolation the question: Is there a 
       compelling state interest here? Rather, the phrase 
       describes an interest which appears important enough 
       to justify the particular search at hand, in light of 
       other factors which show the search to be relatively 
       intrusive upon a genuine expectation of privacy. 
 
Vernonia, 115 S.Ct. at 2394-95. Thus, "compelling interest" 
does not have the same meaning in this context as it does 
in other areas of constitutional law. Moreover, the fact that 
there exists a less intrusive method of achieving the 
government's goal is not relevant to the Court's 
reasonableness analysis under the Fourth Amendment. 
Vernonia, 115 S.Ct. at 2396. See also Skinner, 489 U.S. at 
629 n.9; Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 647 (1983). 
 
In this case, we do not review the constitutionality of 
drug-testing per se, but rather, the procedure by which 
firefighters are tested. According to the City and to SODAT, 
visual observation is necessary to prevent cheating. At trial, 
the defendants' expert, Dr. Closson, testified that visual 
monitoring is necessary to catch employees who attempt to 
fool the test by substituting someone else's urine or adding 
a chemical adulterant to their own urine. 
 
On appeal, the plaintiffs argue that cheating can be 
detected by testing the urine's temperature since 
substitutes make the specimen colder than it should be. 
According to Dr. Closson, a forensic toxicologist, cheaters 
still can avoid detection by warming substitute urine 
through a heating pack hidden on their body, or by keeping 
the urine close to their body so that it takes on the body's 
temperature. Closson further maintained that direct 
observation was the most accurate collection method for 
ensuring the integrity of a urine sample. Finally, Closson 
testified that direct observation procedures are used by the 
New York City Police Department, the New York City 
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Department of Corrections, and several other New York 
agencies. 
 
Like the district court, we find the defendants' expert 
testimony persuasive. Cheating is a significant concern. The 
City understandably wishes to take as many steps as 
possible to eliminate potential violations of the drug testing 
program. The plaintiffs argue that the cheating described 
by Dr. Closson is unlikely, as Wilmington firefighters do not 
receive notice that they are to be tested until the day of the 
test, and they remain in the company of a superior officer 
from the moment they are notified of the test until the time 
that they actually provide their urine specimen. Although 
this argument is strong, it does not prove that the 
incidences of cheating, described by Dr. Closson, are 
impossible or even implausible. Although such cheating 
calls for fairly sophisticated equipment, it is possible for a 
firefighter with a drug problem to carry a catheter or an 
artificial bladder taped to his body on the days following 
drug use, just in case he is tested on that day. Indeed, Dr. 
Closson stated that cheating has been known to take place 
within the New York agencies, which use the direct 
observation method. 
 
Under Supreme Court jurisprudence, the City of 
Wilmington need not wait for a cheating problem to develop 
in order to justify its use of direct observation. In Von Raab, 
for example, Justice Scalia noted that the Supreme Court 
upheld random mandatory drug testing of customs officials, 
even though there existed no evidence of a history of drug 
abuse among those government employees. See Von Raab, 
489 U.S. at 679 (Scalia, dissenting). Moreover, the fact that 
there exists a less intrusive method of achieving the 
government's goal is not relevant to the Court's Fourth 
Amendment analysis. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 629 n.9; Illinois 
v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 647 (1983). 
 
Finally, we do not agree with the plaintiffs' argument that 
SODAT renders its direct observation procedure ineffective 
(and thereby unnecessary) by directing monitors not to look 
at the firefighters' genitals. Certainly, the mere presence of 
a monitor in the room where the firefighter is urinating 
deters a would-be-cheater from substituting or adulterating 
his own urine sample. Thus, we must agree with the 
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district court that the direct observation procedure serves 
the government's interest of preventing cheating on drug 
tests. 
 
Because we find that SODAT's direct observation method, 
as described in the district court's findings of fact, meets 
the three elements of the Fourth Amendment 
reasonableness test, we hold that the plaintiffs' Fourth 
Amendment rights have not been violated.7  The City's 
significant interest in preserving the integrity of its 
firefighters' drug tests outweighs their expectations of 
privacy. With regard to the male firefighters, the conditions 
created by SODAT do not differ significantly from the 
conditions present in an ordinary public restroom. As for 
the female firefighters, we note the district court's finding 
that SODAT has taken several steps to minimize the 
potentially intrusive effects of having a person present in 
the same room during the collection of a femalefirefighter's 
urine. So long as SODAT's monitors refrain from looking at 
the firefighters' genitalia, its direct observation procedure 
remains within the boundaries of a constitutional search. 
Accordingly, the district court did not err when it ruled in 
the defendants' favor on the issue of constitutionality under 
the Fourth Amendment.8 
 
IV. WAIVER OF JURY TRIAL 
 
Two days into the trial, the plaintiffs brought to the 
district court's attention our statement in Bolden v. SEPTA 
that reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment was an 
issue to be decided by the judge. See Bolden, 953 F.2d at 
822. Based on its reading of Bolden, the district court, with 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. We note that the D.C. Circuit has come to the opposite conclusion 
with regard to this issue. See Piroglu v. T.R. Coleman, 25 F.3d 1098 (D.C. 
Cir. 1994); National Treas. Employees v. Yeutter, 918 F.2d 968, 976 (D.C. 
Cir. 1990). These cases, however, were decided prior to the Supreme 
Court's decision in Vernonia. 
 
8. Because we affirm the district court's disposition of plaintiffs' 
Fourth 
Amendment claim, we need not review either the district court's 
determination that SODAT was not a state actor, or its conclusion that 
the City defendants, as sued in their individual capacities, were entitled 
to qualified immunity. 
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plaintiffs' agreement, dismissed the jury. Plaintiffs now 
claim that this was error and that the district court violated 
their right to a jury trial. We reject this argument as lacking 
merit. Although plaintiffs had a right to a jury trial, they 
waived that right when they acquiesced in the district 
court's dismissal of the jury. 
 
       Rule 39(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
       states: 
       When trial by jury has been demanded as provided in 
       Rule 38, the action shall be designated upon the 
       docket as a jury action. The trial of all issues so 
       demanded shall be by jury unless (1) the parties or 
       their attorneys of record, by written stipulationfiled 
       with the court or by an oral stipulation made in open 
       court and entered in the record, consent to trial by the 
       court sitting without a jury or (2) the court upon motion 
       or its own initiative finds that a right of trial by jury of 
       some or all of those issues does not exist under the 
       Constitution or statutes of the United States. 
 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 39(a) (emphasis added). This Court has 
stated that once a party makes a timely demand for a jury 
trial, that party subsequently waives that right when it 
participates in a bench trial without objection. See Cooper 
v. Loper, 923 F.2d 1045, 1049 (3d Cir. 1991). Numerous 
courts have adopted this position. See generally 5 James 
Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice, P39.03 n.5-6 
(2d ed. 1988) (consent can be inferred from conduct of 
parties or counsel). See also Royal American Managers, Inc. 
v. IRC Holding Corp., 885 F.2d 1011 (2d Cir. 1989) (plaintiff 
waived right to jury trial in securities action by 
participating in bench trial without objection); Pope v. 
Savings Bank of Puget Sound, 850 F.2d 1345, 1355 (9th 
Cir. 1988) (counsel's agreement with court's announced 
intent to dismiss jury, as well as actual knowledge that jury 
was being discharged, constituted waiver of jury trial right 
under Rule 39(a)). 
 
Based on these principles, we find that the plaintiffs 
waived their jury trial right under Rule 39(a). On the third 
day of trial, the plaintiffs' attorneys submitted a letter to 
the district court notifying it that under Bolden the issue of 
reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment was a legal 
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issue for the court. In response to this letter, the trial judge 
stated his intention to dismiss the jurors because there 
remained no liability questions for them to decide. The 
plaintiffs' counsel objected to this course of action only 
insofar as damages were concerned. The court agreed that, 
should the plaintiffs prevail on any of the liability 
questions, he would either recall the jury or assemble a 
new one to hear evidence relating to damages. 
 
Based on the dialogue between the district judge and the 
plaintiffs' attorney, we conclude the plaintiffs waived their 
jury trial right under Rule 39(a). The sole concern of the 
plaintiffs' attorney was that the trial court preserve the 
damages issue for a jury trial in the future. She did not 
argue that the plaintiffs were entitled to a jury on the 
invasion of privacy claims. Nor did she argue that the 
plaintiffs were entitled to a jury verdict on the factual 
aspects of their Fourth Amendment claim (such as whether 
the SODAT employees actually looked at the firefighters' 
genitals while they urinated). Hence, whatever rights the 
plaintiffs had, their counsel waived when she explicitly 
agreed with the district court's decision to dismiss the jury.9 
 
V. FOURTH AMENDMENT "REASONABLENESS" VS. THE 
       STATE LAW "REASONABLE PERSON" STANDARD 
 
Finally, we will reverse the district court's ruling insofar 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. Although the plaintiffs waived their jury trial rights, we nevertheless 
note that the district court misapplied our statement in Bolden when it 
concluded that there were no factual issues for the jury to decide. The 
fact that reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is a legal issue 
does not make all issues under the Fourth Amendment legal in nature. 
 
For example, in Dykes v. SEPTA, 68 F.3d 1564, 1568 (3d Cir. 1995), 
we addressed a claim that SEPTA had violated its own drug-testing 
policy by testing the plaintiff without reasonable suspicion. Reiterating 
our statement in Bolden, we held that the specific question of whether 
SEPTA had reasonable suspicion to test the plaintiff (i.e. evidence that 
he might be using drugs) was factual. See 68 F.3d at 1567. Thus, our 
statement in Bolden applied only to the ultimate determination of 
whether SODAT's drug testing procedure qualified as "reasonable" under 
the Fourth Amendment, not to any determination of the factual elements 
of that procedure. 
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as it equated the Fourth Amendment "reasonableness" 
standard with the much different common law "reasonable 
person" standard. Invasion of privacy is a tort claim under 
state law. Delaware adopted the Restatement of Tort's 
definition of this claim in Barbieri v. News-Journal Co., 189 
A.2d 773, 774 (Del. 1963). Under the Restatement, 
plaintiffs can prove a common law invasion of privacy if 
they show that defendants intentionally intruded on the 
firefighters' physical solitude or private affairs or concerns 
in such a manner that a reasonable person wouldfind 
"highly offensive." (Restatement (Second) of Torts, S 652B 
(1977)). See also Barker v. Huang, 610 A.2d 1341, 1350 
(Del. 1992). 
 
The district court concluded that since it had ruled 
against plaintiffs on their constitutional claim, it could not 
possibly find in their favor on their state law invasion of 
privacy claim. "Even assuming that the monitors intruded 
upon the firefighters' solitude, the Court has determined 
that the collection procedures used by SODAT were 
reasonable under constitutional principles." Wilcher, 924 
F.Supp. at 619. 
 
The district court's assumption that "reasonableness" 
under the Fourth Amendment is analogous to a "reasonable 
person" standard under state common law is erroneous. A 
state may provide its citizens with greater protection of 
their individual rights than does the federal constitution. 
For example, in Kelley v. Schlumberger Technology Corp., 
849 F.2d 41 (1st Cir. 1988), the court struck down a drug 
testing procedure because it violated the state constitution. 
Moreover, it is beyond argument that a district court 
cannot, a fortiori, apply a federal standard of law to a cause 
of action grounded in the common law of the state in which 
it sits. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 
(1938). Hence, the trial court incorrectly concluded, as a 
matter of law, that a reasonable Delawarean could not find 
the drug testing procedure "highly offensive," simply 
because the test might have passed muster under the 
Fourth Amendment.10 We will therefore remand this issue 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. The district court also dismissed the plaintiffs' invasion of privacy 
claims because, "the `intrusion into physical solitude' claimed by the 
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to the district court to determine whether the "reasonable 
person" standard under Delaware common law wouldfind 
the practices employed by SODAT "highly offensive."11 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
Based on the foregoing discussion, we will affirm the 
district court's ruling on the plaintiffs' constitutional claim. 
So long, at least, as the SODAT employees continue to 
employ the safeguards discussed in Part III, their direct 
observation method does not violate the Fourth 
Amendment. 
 
In addition, we will affirm the district court's dismissal of 
the jury because the plaintiffs waived their jury trial right 
when they acquiesced on the record to the dismissal. 
Moreover, as we note in footnote 1, we will vacate the 
district court's holding that SODAT's drug testing 
procedure was permissible under the Collective Bargaining 
Agreement. Finally, we will vacate the dismissal of the state 
law invasion of privacy claim and remand this case to the 
district court for reconsideration of the state law issues. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Plaintiffs resulting from the direct observation method was consented to 
by written contract." Wilcher, 924 F.Supp. at 619. We find the court's 
statement on this matter puzzling, as the court has cited no portion of 
the Collective Bargaining Agreement in which the firefighters actually 
consented to such a method of drug testing. 
 
11. We know of no Delaware case that has discussed or been presented 
with this issue. We do not predict at this juncture what the Delaware 
Supreme Court would do if presented with this issue. Cf. Epstein Family 
Partnership v. Kmart Corp., 13 F.3d 762, 765 (3d Cir. 1994) (if state 
court has not ruled on issue, federal district court must predict how it 
would decide issue). Moreover, the fact that direct observation method 
passes muster under the Fourth Amendment certainly may be raised by 
the City and SODAT in defense of the invasion of privacy claim. We 
simply hold that a federal district court cannot presume that a state's 
common law tort standard and a constitutional balancing test would 
reach the same result when applied to the same set of facts. The 
reasonableness of a procedure under the Fourth Amendment may be 
relevant to the inquiry under state law, but it is not necessarily 
dispositive of the state law claim. 
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